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Abstract
A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors
in order to play a 2 × 2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how
the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium
neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the size of the communica-
tion costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite
graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show
a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if neighbors play a pure
coordination game.
JEL classification: C72, C92
Keywords: Coordination games, network formation, local interaction, equilibrium
selection
1 Introduction
Coordination games attracted many theoretically and experimentally oriented
economists during the past decade (see, for example, van Huyck/Battalio/Beil,
1990, Cooper et al., 1992, Berninghaus/Schwalbe, 1996a, Young, 1998). In our
paper we consider simple symmetric normal form 2 × 2 games which are char-
acterized by having two equilibria in pure strategies. If such a 2 × 2 game is
played in large populations with players who are pairwise randomly matched a
serious equilibrium selection problem may arise. We know from the theoretical
(e.g., Boyer/Orleans, 1992) and the experimental literature (e.g., Cooper et al.,
1992) that in case of pure coordination games both symmetric equilibria may
be candidates for strategy selection. In coordination games with two asymmet-
ric equilibria still less is known about strategy choice in experimental games.
Conventions might sometimes help to solve these problems (Lewis, 1969, Young,
1993, Berninghaus 2003). By conventions players are guided to select a particu-
lar equilibrium and, therefore, avoid coordination failures. In real world societies
conventions will not arise spontaneously but rather result from a long run evolu-
tionary process.
The problem of the evolution of conventions in large populations has often
been considered under a particular assumption concerning neighborhood struc-
tures or local interaction structures in the populations (see, for example, Bern-
inghaus/Schwalbe, 1996a, 1996b, Eshel et al., 1998, Blume, 1993). In such a
framework a member of the population is not supposed to be randomly matched
with any other member of the population but he is only matched with members of
his neighborhood which is a proper subset of the whole population. The neighbor-
hoods of the players constitute a local interaction structure or sometimes called a
network structure on the population. Much of research in this field has been de-
voted to populations with exogenously fixed local interaction structures imposed
on the population.1 In recent research this restrictive assumption has been relaxed
and players were allowed to choose their neighbors in each period by themselves
(see, Bala/Goyal, 2000, Goyal/Vega-Redondo, 2002, Jackson/Wolinsky, 1996).
In these models local interaction structures are regarded as a result of individual
equilibrium decisions and not as being imposed exogeneously.
In our paper we consider two types of 2 × 2 coordinations games which are
played in a population, that is, pure coordination games and Hawk/Dove games as
well. In pure coordinations games equilibria in pure strategies are characterized
by the requirement that players choose the same strategy, while Hawk/Dove
games equilibria in pure strategies are characterized by the requirement that both
players choose different strategies (aymmetric equilibria). Hawk/Dove games
have a long tradition in evolutionary game theory. Maynard Smith and Price
1For example, players have been supposed to be located at a circle or at a two-dimensional
grid.
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(1973) developed their famous equilibrium concept, the evolutionary stable state
(ESS), for this type of games. In an evolutionary framework one has the following
interpretation in mind. Two members of a species are randomly matched to
compete for the same territory. If both members choose the Hawk strategy this
results in territory fighting with serious wounds for both. If they choose the Dove
strategy they share the territory after some kind of ritual fighting. The only Nash
equilibria in pure strategies are the asymmetric strategy configurations (Hawk,
Dove) resp. (Dove, Hawk). The only symmetric equilibrium is the mixed strategy
equilibrium which can be shown to be the unique ESS of the game.
Coordination in large populations with pure coordination games has been ex-
tensively studied during the past decade (see, for example, van Huyck/Battalio/Beil,
1990, Cooper, 1999). We do not know of comparable studies for Hawk/Dove
games. We argue that successfull coordination in large populations is much more
interesting in Hawk/Dove games than in pure coordination games since each
player wants to be matched only with players who employ just the opposite
strategy. First experimental results (see Berninghaus/Vogt, 2003a) support our
view.
In our paper we analyze which types of equilibrium networks prove to be com-
patible with the underlying coordination game when players are allowed to select
simultaneously their neighbors in the population and the strategy in the base
game. Decision making is supposed to be deterministic. Opening a new link to a
member of the population is supposed to generate constant connection costs per
link for the agent who initiates the link. It is easy to see that the relative size of
linking costs compared with the payoffs of the 2×2 game has a big impact on the
resulting equilibrium network in the population. Similar work on this topic has
been done by Goyal/Vega-Redondo (2002). They concentrate on pure coordina-
tion games and, furthermore, analyze the stochastic stable states of the process of
network formation for pure coordination games by introducing mutation at the
individual level of strategy and partner choice. Our model is purely static. We
consider simultaneous network linking choice and action choice in the coordina-
tion game to be elements of a one shot game. It is the main aim of our study to
study the impact of the particular coordination base game on the resulting equi-
librium network structure. The resulting equilibrium networks are characterized
by non directed graphs. Depending on the particular value of linking costs we
obtain different graphs for pure coordination and Hawk/Dove games. Our work
is an extension of pure network formation approaches (e.g., Bala/Goyal, 2000) in
which only network decisions are considered abstracting from any other strate-
gic decisions in 2 × 2 base games. And it is also in some sense an extension of
Goy0al/Vega-Redondo’s results (2002) since we also consider Hawk/Dove games
as coordination base games in the process of network formation.2
2Note, however, that the goal of Goyal/Vega-Tedondo’s paper to deduce stochastically stable
states is different from ours.
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2 Model description and results
2.1 Hawk/Dove games
We consider a set I = {1, . . . , n} of n agents who are engaged in playing a
Hawk/Dove game with each of his neighbors who are linked via a network of
players (=local interaction structure). If two players i and j are linked with each
other they play the Hawk/Dove game for one period. The Hawk/Dove game is a
symmetric 2× 2 normal form game ΠHD = {Σ, H(·)} with Σ := {X, Y } which is
characterized by the payoff table
X Y
X d,d a,c
Y c,a b,b
with a > b > c > d > 0, i.e. Y is called the “dove strategy” and X is called the
“hawk strategy”.
We do not impose a fixed network structure on the population of players
but assume that networks can be built up by individual decision making. More
precisely, we assume that all players participate in a network game. An individual
strategy in the network game of player i is a vector of ones and zeros gi ∈
{0, 1}n−1. We say that player i wants to establish a link to player j if gij = 1,
otherwise it is equal to zero. A link between two players allows both players to
play the simple Hawk/Dove game ΠHD. Note, that a bilateral connection between
two players is supposed to be already established if at least one player wants to
open it.3
Each strategy configuration g = (g1, . . . , gn) generates a directed graph de-
noted by Gg, where the vertices represent players and a directed edge between
i and j, i.e. gij = 1, signals that i plans to open a link with j. In the following
we will ignore the orientation of the edges and regard the graph as non directed
graph. The neighbors of player i given a network Gg is defined to be the set
of players to whom i wants to open a link (active neighbors, gij = 1) and the
players who want to open a link with i (passive neighbors, gji = 1). By defining
g¯ij := max{gij, gji} we sinply define the set of neighbors as follows
Ni(Gg) := {j | g¯ij = 1}.
3This assumption and its extensions have been extensively discussed in the literature on
network formation (see Bala/Goyal, 2000, and Jackson/Wolinsky, 1996). At a first glance it
seems to be strange that a player has to accept the offer of any other player to play with him.
However, this assumption simplifies the model considerably and, moreover, Berninghaus/Vogt
(2003b) show that by this assumption one obtains results which do not significantly differ from
a model in which both players have to agree befor a link is opened. This is at least true in
the model framework we consider in this paper. Moreover, Goyal/Vega-Redondo (2002) argue
that positive payoffs in the base game suffice to induce a rational player to agree to play with
a partner who just opened a link to him. By refusing to play with him he would actually lose
payoff.
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The cardinality of this set is given by ni(Gg) := |Ni(Gg)|.
Obviously, the set of neighbors need not concide with the set of active neigh-
bors which only depends on i’s strategy network strategy vector gi. We define set
of active neigbors of i as follows
Nai (gi) := {j | gij = 1}.
The cardinality of the set of direct neighbors is defined by nai (gi) := |Nai (gi)|.
We suppose that it is not costless to establish a link with another player.
Therefore, total payoff of player i in the network game is composed of the aggre-
gate payoff player i can extract from playing with her neighbors and the costs
of establishing links to her active neighbors. Let k denote the constant linking
costs. Since the payoff player i can extract from playing the Hawk/Dove game
depends on his own strategy choice, the strategy choice of his (direct) neighbors
and the network generated by g we define
ΠXi (σ−i, g) := a
∑
j∈Ni(Gg)
1σj=X + b
∑
j∈Ni(Gg)
1σj=Y − knai (gi),
ΠYi (σ−i, g) := c
∑
j∈Ni(Gg)
1σj=X + d
∑
j∈Ni(Gg)
1σj=Y − knai (gi),
where ΠXi (·) resp. ΠYi (·) denotes the payoff a player choosing X resp. Y can gain
and σ = (σ−i, σi) denotes the vector of actions σi ∈ {X, Y } for the H/D game.
An important consequence of our payoff definition is player i may benefit from a
connection to j although she has not to pay for it (that is, gij = 0, but gji = 1).
For the following we use the convention concerning payoff:
Π
(·)
i (·, g) ≡ 0 if the set of i’s neighborsNi(Gg) is empty. More generally,
if a strategy configuration g generates the empty network, i.e. a graph
Gg in which all vertices are isolated then the payoff of each player is
equal to zero.
We model the strategic situation of a player in a population as a non-cooperative
game in which individual strategies are composed of the simultaneous choice of
neighbors i ∈ I and actions σi ∈ {X, Y } in the bilateral H/D game. That is, we
consider a non-cooperative game in normal form
Γ = {S1, . . . , Sn, P1(·), . . . , Pn(·)}
with Si := {0, 1}n−1 × {X, Y } and
Pi : S1 × . . .× Sn −→ IR
where
Pi(s) := Π
σi
i (σ−i, g).
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Each strategy configuration s = (s1, . . . , sn) in Γ induces a network represented
by a non directed graph G}.
It remains to consider which network structures Gg and action configurations
σ in Γ will prove to be stable ? Our notion of stability is purely non-cooperative.
Therefore, we use a canonical extension of the Nash concept to our model of
endogenous network formation.
Definition 1 The strategy configuration s∗ = (g∗, σ∗) in Γ is an equilibrium if
∀i : Pi(s∗−i, s∗i ) ≥ Pi(s∗−i, si) for si ∈ Si.
In an equilibrium no player has an incentive either to change his neighbors or to
change his action choice σ∗i unilaterally.
It follows immediately from the equilibrium definition that we need not con-
sider configurations g = (g1, . . . , gn) in which two players simultaneously want to
open a bilateral link with each other, that is, if the relations gij = gji = 1 hold
for two players i, j ∈ I. In this case either i or j could improve her payoff by
dropping the link and thereby saving linking costs k. Such networks can never be
equilibrium candidates. Therefore, we concentrate on so called simple networks
as equilibrium candidates.
Definition 2 A strategy configuration s = (g, σ) is called simple if the following
relation holds
∀i, j : g¯ij = 1 =⇒ gij · gji = 0.
A simple strategy configuration s always generates a simple non directed graph.4
In the following theorem we characterize equilibrium network structures and
action configurations in a population playing the Hawk/Dove game. We will see
that in most cases it suffices to consider networks represented by non directed
graphs where the orientation of the underlying bilateral links can be in either
direction.
Theorem 1 Given a HD-game Γ, then the following statements hold:
a) If k > a then the unique equilibrium network Gg∗ is the empty network and
the action choice of each player in the Hawk/Dove game is not determined.
b) If k < d then the unique equilibrium network Gg¯∗ is the complete graph. In
the complete graph no uniform choice of either X or Y is possible as an
equilibrium action choice. Let n∗X resp. n
∗
Y denote the number of players
4A non directed graph is called to be simple if it has no loops and each pair of vertices is
connected by at most one edge.
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choosing X resp. Y as an equilibrium choice in the complete network then
these numbers are determined by the relation
n(a− b)− (a− b)
a− b+ c− d < n
∗
X <
n(a− b) + (c− d)
(a− b+ c− d) (1)
and n∗Y = n− n∗X .
c) If the relations d < k < c hold then an equilibrium network Gg∗ is a graph
whose vertices can be partitioned into two non-empty sets I1 of X-players
and I2 of Y -players such that all vertices in I1 are connected with all vertices
in I2 but not with each other while all vertices in I2 are also connected with
each other. Again uniform action choice is not possible in equilibrium and
the number of players choosing X (n∗X) has to satisfy the condition
n(a− b)− (a− b)
a− b+ c− d < n
∗
X <
n(a− b) + (c− k)
a− b+ c− k (2)
and n∗Y = n− n∗X .
d) If the relation c < k < b holds then Gg∗ is a bipartite graph where each vertex
in a set I1 (X-players) is connected with all vertices in I2 (Y -players) but
not with vertices in I1, while all vertices in I2 are also connected with each
other. Furthermore, Y players do not have active links with X players.
Again no uniform action choice can be part of an equilibrium. n∗X has to
satisfy the condition
n∗X >
n(a− b)− (a− b)
a− b+ c− d . (3)
e) If b < k < a then an equilibrium network Gg∗ is characterized either by
a bipartite graph with n∗X , n
∗
Y > 0 which is characterized by the following
property: only X players in I1 have direct links to Y players in I1, that
is, g∗ij = 1 for i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2 while we have g∗ji = 0 for j ∈ I2, i ∈ I1
and, furthermore, g∗jm = 0 for j,m ∈ I2 resp. j,m ∈ I1. Or the equilibrium
network is the empty graph where n∗X = n.
Proof: a) Suppose there exists at least one link between two players i and j, i.e.
g¯∗ij = 1. Since k is supposed to be larger than the maximum payoff a player can
gain from the Hawk/Dove game the net payoff from each link is negative irre-
spectively of the individual action choices in the Hawk/Dove game. Therefore,
establishing no link to any other player results in maximum individual payoff
equal to 0 according to our convention on payoffs. Consequently, payoff is inde-
pendent of a player’s action choice and, therefore, action choice is not determined.
b) First let us suppose that k < d. Since opening a new connection to either an
X or a Y player results in positive net payoffs it pays to open as many links as
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possible where it has to be taken into account that a player i should only open a
link to j if gji = 0, otherwise payoffs do not have the Nash property.
Obviously, no uniform action configuration (n∗X = n or n
∗
Y = n) is in equilibrium,
since any player i could switch to the opposite action and increase her payoff.
Now let us consider the case n∗X , n
∗
Y > 0. For a player choosing X the payoff has
to be higher than for choosing Y. Then the following condition has to be satisfied5
(n∗X − 1)d+ n∗Y a > (n∗X − 1)c+ n∗Y b ⇐⇒ (n∗X − 1)(c− d) < n∗Y (a− b).
Analogously, for a player choosing Y the following inequality holds
n∗Xd+ (n
∗
Y − 1)a < n∗Xc+ (n∗Y − 1)b ⇐⇒ n∗X(c− d) > (n∗Y − 1)(a− b).
By substituting n∗Y = n− n∗X we obtain from these inequalities the relations
n∗X <
n(a− b) + (c− d)
a− b+ c− d
and
n∗X >
n(a− b)− (a− b)
a− b+ c− d
which are equivalent to condition (1).
c) Suppose inequality d < k < c holds. Then it will not pay for an X-player to be
connected with other X-players since it will give him negative payoff. However, a
Y -player may open as many connections as possible provided there is not already
another player who opened a link to him. Therefore, the resulting graph can be
partitioned into two sets of vertices I1 (X-players) whose elements are connected
with each vertex of I2 (Y -players) and each element of I2 is, moreover, connected
with each other member of I2.
Uniform action choice is not possible in equilibrium since any player could ben-
efit from either switching from X to Y resp. from Y to X. To determine the
equilibrium number n∗Y of Y resp. n
∗
X of X players we first consider the decision
problem of a X player who can switch from X to Y and open new connections
to the remaining n∗X X players. This will not be profitable for a X player if the
following condition holds
n∗Y a− ni(g∗i )k > n∗Y b− ni(g∗i )k + [(n∗X − 1)c− (n∗X − 1)k],
where the expression in “[...]” brackets denotes the net benefits from opening (as
a Y player) links to the remaining X players.6 This condition is equivalent to
n∗X <
n(a− b) + c− k
a− b+ c− k .
5Since the equilibrium network is the complete graph we omit the connection cost in this
case.
6Note that we required to check the additional payoffs of opening new links to all remaining
X players. Because of (c− k) > 0 this suffices to make it not profitable to open new links to a
smaller number of X players than (n∗X − 1).
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Since all Y players are connected with the rest of the population, Y will be an
equilibrium action choice when it satisfies the condition
n∗Xd+ (n
∗
Y − 1)a < n∗Xc + (n∗Y − 1)b ⇐⇒ n∗X >
n(a− b)− (a− b)
a− b+ c− d .
Both inequalities for n∗X together imply condition 2.
d) Now suppose that c < k < b holds. Then it follows from the arguments
of the proof of part c) that each X-player will only connect to a Y -player. Y
players, however, will only connect with Y players since any other link will give
them negative payoffs. Therefore, the graph generated by g∗ is a bipartite graph
where the whole set of vertices can be partitioned into two non-empty sets I1
(X-players) and I2 (Y -players) such that all elements of I1 are connected only to
elements of I2 and all elements of I2 are connected with one another. Obviously,
no uniform action choice can be part of an equilibrium.
For a X player it is not profitable to deviate to Y since the relation
n∗Y a− ni(g∗i )k > n∗Y b− ni(g∗i )k
holds (because of a > b). For a Y player the following condition has to be
satisfied7
n∗Xc+ (n
∗
Y − 1)b− ni(g∗i )k > n∗Xd+ (n∗Y − 1)a− ni(g∗i )k
which can easily be transformed to condition 3.
e) Consider a Y player. His maximum payoff is equal to b which can be reached
by playing with other Y players. However, because of k > b a Y player cannot
extract positive net payoffs from any connection (with either a X or Y player).
Therefore, in an equilibrium network Y players cannot have active neighbors.
The maximum payoff of a X player is equal to a which can only be reached by
being matched with a Y player. Furthermore, X can extract only a positive net
payoff from being linked to a Y player (as his active neighbor). By being linked to
another X player he obtains a negative net payoff. Therefore, the only candidate
for an equilibrium network is a graph where the vertice set can be partioned into
two sets I1 (of X players) and I2 (of Y players).
Obviously, uniform choice of Y is not possible in equilibrium since each player can
benefit from switching to X and build up links to at least one of the remaining
Y players. However, uniform choice of X is only possible when the resulting
equilibrium network is the empty graph.
7Note that ni(g∗i )k denotes the linking costs with the remaining Y players. A Y player
need only consider action switching from Y to X. It does not pay to change the links with the
remaining players.
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q.e.d.
Remarks A) Note that in part b) of the theorem a complete graph may be
generated by many different individual Nash configurations g which only have to
be simple. As an extreme case one could consider a complete graph in which there
is one player who need not open any link with the remaining (n−1) players since
they all want to be linked with him. Indeed, one can easily check that this is also
an equilibrium network. Similar conclusions hold for the equilibrium networks in
part c) and d) of the theorem. When a link between two players exists it does
not matter which player opened the link. Consequently, in equilibrium networks
payoffs may vary significantly from one player to the next even if they choose the
same action.
B) In part c), d) and e) of the theorem we characterize equilibrium constellations
s∗ by the type of graph which is generated by g∗. Obviously, there exist many
ways how to partition the players’ set I into two non-empty sets I1 (X players)
and I2 (Y players). Therefore, there exist finitely many action choice equilibria
where the players, however, all are connected by the same type of network.
C) The result of d) shows that all dove players are connected with each other but
do not have active links to hawk players. One could call this situation a “dove
network” which is stabilized by some hawk “invaders”. Note that the doves in this
network are playing non-equilibrium strategies of the one shot HD game. This
demonstrates drastically that the strategic decision problem in a one shot game
changes when considered as a part of a more general network decision problem.
D) Our result in part e) has an interesting economic interpretation. We see that
part of the population (X-players in I1) is subsidized by the remaining part (Y -
players in I2). X players benefit from playing with Y players without bearing the
linking costs. This is due to our particular assumption on establishing links and
the supposed restriction on linking costs k.
E) It is well known in the theory of network formation (see Bala and Goyal, 2000,
Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2002) that so called star shaped network structures may
be stable equilibria in a particular model of strategic neighbor’s choice. In a star
shaped structure one player (the “center” of the star) is connected with the rest
of the population and the remaining players are exclusively linked to the “center”
player. Our bipartite (directed) graph can be interpreted as a generalization of
the star shaped structure such that in our structure we have finitely many (≥ 1)
“center” players.
2.2 Pure coordination games
In this section we assume that if two players i and j are linked with each other
they play a pure coordination game. The symmetric 2 × 2 pure coordination
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game is a symmetric normal form game ΠC = {Σ, H(·)} with Σ := {X, Y } which
is characterized by the payoff table
X Y
X b,b c,d
Y d,c a,a
with a > b > c > d > 0 and (b− d) > (a− c), i.e. (Y, Y ) is the payoff dominant
equilibrium and (X,X) is the risk dominant equilibrium.
As in the previous section we do not impose a fixed network structure on the
population of players but assume that networks can be built up by individual
decisions. All members of the population are supposed to be players of the
network game Γ which has already been introduced in the previous section. It has
the same formal structure as before only the restrictions concerning the numerical
payoffs of the 2×2 base game are changed. It will be demonstrated by the results
of the following theorem that the resulting equilibrium network structures will
be completely changed by altering the payoff structure of the base game from a
Hawk/Dove game to a pure coordination game.
Theorem 2 Given a network game Γ where the underlying 2× 2 game is a pure
coordination game.
a) If k > a then the unique equilibrium network Gg∗ is the empty network
and the action choice of each player in the pure coordination game is not
determined.
b) If k < d holds then the unique equilibrium network Gg∗ is the complete graph
and σ∗ is given either by σ∗ = (X, . . . , X) or by σ∗ = (Y, . . . , Y ). That is,
either all players choose the equilibrium strategy X or all players choose the
equilibrium strategy Y.
c) If d < k < c holds then either the equilibrium is the one obtained in part b)
or there is an equilibrium configuration s∗ such that the resulting network
is characterized by a graph Gg∗ with two sets of vertices I1 (X players) and
I2 (Y players) such that g
∗
ij = 1 for i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2 and g¯∗jm = 1 for
j,m ∈ I1 resp. g¯∗jm = 1 for j,m ∈ I2. In this case the numerical payoffs of
the base game and the n∗X the number of players choosing X and n
∗
Y the
number of players choosing Y has to satisfy the relation
n(a− c+ d− k) + (b− d) + ni(g∗i )(k − d)
a− c+ b− k < n
∗
X <
n(a− c)− (a− c)
a− c+ b− d
(4)
for all X players i ∈ I1.
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d) If the relation c < k < b holds then either the equilibrium is the one obtained
in part b) or an equilibrium configuration s∗ induces a disconnected graph
Gg∗ with two components where each component is a complete graph and
players in one component (I1) choose action X, players in the other com-
ponent (I2) choose action Y. The number of X players n
∗
X has to satisfy the
condition
n(a− k) + (b− d) + ni(g∗i )(k − d)
a + b− k − d < n
∗
X <
n(a− c)− (a− c) + nj(g∗j )(c− k)
a + b− k − c
(5)
for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2.
e) If the relation b < k < a holds then an equilibrium network Gg∗ is the
complete graph with all players choosing Y. An alternative equilibrium is
the empty graph with all players choosing X.
Proof: a) Same arguments as in theorem 1 hold.
b) The arguments concerning equilibrium network formation for k < d are anal-
ogous to theorem 1. Since each connection to another player increases a player’s
payoff he tries to open as many links as possible, provided the resulting network is
a simple one. Therefore, the complete graph is the only candidate for an equilib-
rium network. If all players choose X or Y this is obviously an equilibrium action
choice. It can easily be seen that nX > 0 and nY > 0 is not compatible with an
equilibrium choice. For, suppose nX , nY > 0, then for an X resp. Y -player the
following relations must hold
(n∗X − 1)b+ n∗Y c > (n∗X − 1)d+ n∗Y a ⇐⇒ (n∗X − 1)(b− d) > n∗Y (a− c)
⇐⇒ n
∗
X − 1
n∗Y
>
(a− c)
(b− d) ,
n∗Xb+ (n
∗
Y − 1)c < n∗Xd+ (n∗Y − 1)a ⇐⇒ n∗X(b− d) < (n∗Y − 1)(a− c)
⇐⇒ n
∗
X
n∗Y − 1
<
(a− c)
(b− d) ,
which implies
n∗X
n∗Y − 1
<
n∗X − 1
n∗Y
,
a contradiction.
c) Suppose that d < k < c holds. It is obvious that the equlibria of part b)
are also equilibria in this case. If some players select X and some select Y the
following holds. A Y player makes positive profits when he is connected with
another Y player while he extracts negative payoffs ((d − k) < 0) when opening
a link to a X player. However, he benefits if a X player wants to open a link
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with him. On the other hand, a X player benefits from opening as many links as
possible (with X and Y players as well).
It only remains to be shown that there is no incentive for an X player or Y player
to deviate from his strategy choice. For a X player i it is not profitable for him
to switch to Y and dropping his links with X players if the following inequality
holds
(n∗X −1)b+n∗Y c− (ni(g∗i )−n∗Y )k−n∗Y k > (n∗X −1− (ni(g∗i )−n∗Y ))d+n∗Y a−kn∗Y
where (ni(g
∗
i ) − n∗Y ) is the number of direct links a X player has established to
other X players. This inequality is equivalent to the inequality
n∗X >
n(a− c+ d− k) + (b− d) + ni(g∗i )(k − d)
(a− c + b− k) .
For a Y player the following condition has to be satisfied
n∗Xd+ (n
∗
Y − 1)a− ni(g∗i )k > n∗Xb+ (n∗Y − 1)c− ni(g∗i )k
which is equivalent to the inequality
n∗X <
n(a− c)− (a− c)
a− c+ b− d .
Both restrictions on n∗X imply condition 4.
d) As in case b) and d) the complete graph with all players selecting either X
or Y is an equilibrium. If some players select X and some select Y the following
holds. For X players it is profitable to build up as many links as possible with
other X players. The same argument holds for Y players. All other links result
in a payoff loss (either (c− k) < 0 or (b− k) < 0). In order to have no incentive
for a X player to deviate it suffices to consider the effects of an action switch
from X to Y together with opening links to all Y players. Such a deviation is
not profitable when the inequality8
(n∗X − 1)b− ni(g∗i )k > n∗Y a− n∗Y k + (n∗X − 1− ni(g∗i ))d
is satisfied which is equivalent to
n∗X >
n(a− k) + (b− d) + ni(g∗i )(k − d)
a+ b− k − d .
8In calculating the payoff generated by deviation not that a) building up new links to all
Y players generates communication costs equal to n∗Y k and b) a deviating X player has still
(n∗X − 1− ni(g∗i ) X players who have active links with him. From each of these players he will
extract an individual payoff of equal to d.
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For a Y player an analogous restriction holds
(n∗Y − 1)a− nj(g∗j )k > n∗Xb− n∗Xk + (n∗Y − 1− nj(g∗j ))c
which can equivalently be transformed into
n∗X <
n(a− c)− (a− c) + nj(g∗j )(c− k)
a + b− k − c .
Both restrictions on n∗X imply condition 5.
e) Since a > k > b it only pays for an individual player to choose Y and to
look for as many Y -player connections as possible. However, this argument only
works when at least one player in the population selects Y. If all players choose
X the best reply of each individual player is to shut down all connections with
the remaining players.
q.e.d.
Remarks A The result in part d) and e) of theorem 2 seems to have some
features in common with the literature on “equilibrium selection by migration”
(e.g., Ely, 1995, Bhaskar/Vega-Redondo, 1996). In these models players can move
to different locations where they play a simple 2×2 coordination game with each
player at the same location. As a main result it can be demonstrated that all
players move to the same location where the payoff dominant equilibrium will
be played provided the migration costs are low enough. In our framework, we
have the opposite implications of communication costs. Moderate communication
costs prevent players from coordination failure and let players build up isolated
groups in which they choose the same action. If communication costs are large
enough such that they make coordination on X not profitable then players select
the payoff dominant equilibrium in one completely connected group.
B) We know from theoretictal and experimental work on equilibrium selection
in coordination games that there exist many situations in which players do not
select the payoff dominant equilibrium in coordination games (see, for example,
Kandori/Mailath/Rob, 1993, Berninghaus/Schwalbe, 1996a, Cooper, 1999). In
our framework it can be guaranteed that the payoff dominant equilibrium in the
coordination game is selected if connection costs are “large enough.” This is made
precise by the condition on k in part e) of theorem 2.
3 Concluding remarks
Our results in theorems 1 and 2 show drastically the impact of communication
costs and the type of the base game on network formation. As a main conclusion
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we state that one cannot separate the network linking decision from the action
decision in a particular base game. Strategy choice in a population of players cru-
cially depends on the communication (=linking) costs and the numerical payoff
constellations in the base game.
Our framework is still rather simple and completely static. It should be ex-
tended in many ways. First, it is certainly not very realistic to assume that players
will find an equilibrium in such a complicated one-shot network game Γ in one
period. We need to find an extension of our simple static model to a dynamic
strategy adaptation process in which players change their decisions (network and
actions decisions) according to some well defined adaptation rules. One could also
incorporate into such a dynamic process the more or less plausible assumption
that players show a lower speed of adaptation in their network decisions than in
their action decisions (in the base game). For example, one could model that
neighborhood decisions are revised every 5th period while action decisions may
be changed in every period.
In communication network games it is often assumed that one player can
reach many players by one active link to another player provided this player is
connected with many other players via active or passive links. It is not easy to
justify such an assumption in game networks, where all relationsships are only
bilateral (at least for two person games). Nevertheless, it seems to be interesting
to “experiment” with this assumption. One could assume, for example, that
opening a link to a player would guarantee access to his “club” of active and
passive neighbors. A similar assumption has been made in pure communication
networks (Berninghaus/Ott/Vogt, 2003). Many other variants of access to a
player’s neighborhood is possible.
Finally, one can think of substituting the simple 2×2 symmetric coordination
games by more complex ones, either by asymmetric coordination games or by
N × N coordinations games (for N > 2). Which equilibrium networks could be
expected in such models ?
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